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This is a study of the causes of business failures
iD the United States during the ten year period, 1938
through 19^7* The report reveals a complete account of
these causes which was determined from an analysis of
the numbers, types, and trends of industrial and com-
mercial discontinuances occurring in these years as well
as from a study of the business conditions that existed
at the time. Also, plausible explanations are given for
the peculiar behavior of the business cycle in this period
It is noteworthy that in the United States the
small business man is recognized as the bulwark of the
capitalistic system. Because of this the vast majority
of failed concerns, approximately 90$, are small enter-
prises employing relatively little capital and are given
moderate or no credit rating. About 87$ of all commercial
failures employ $5*000 or less capital in their businesses
Efforts to reduce failures and losses must evolve from a
careful study and analysis of the small business. It is
also significant that about three-quarters of all business
changes relate to retailers. Therefore in the discussion
of the causes of failures in this paper, major emphasis is
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Seasonal swings are so great in the failure records
that any large increase must be examined in the light of
the usual seasonal pattern, so that any change due to
season may be distinguished from that arising from other
forces. An adjusted insolvency index is used in this re-
port to account for seasonal variation. Also employed is
the unadjusted insolvency index which corrects failures for
the number of working days and relates them to the number
of firms in business.
^
The information presented in this report was primarily
secured from a detailed analysis of the monthly issues of
"Dun's Review" from 1938 to 19^7*
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM
This ten year period examined contains the two ex-
tremes of the business cycle, the contraction period and
the boom period, besides the two intermediate phases, the
recession and the expansion. This study begins in the re-
cession phase and continues through the contraction, ex-
pansion, and boom periods.
It is a particularly dynamic period because the
trend of the business cycle, and as a result the trend of
failures, never levels off; it is constantly moving, either
upward or downward. Consequently each year we have a dif-
ferent situation with new causes of failures. Nearly all
1 Duri >3 Review
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3of the generally known causes of business and commercial
failures, as well as the new causes peculiar to World War
II, played important parts in this report.
Prom this study and others similar to it there may
be brought about effective methods for reducing the number
of failures. The danger signals and the putfalls to be
avoided are disclosed and a knowledge of them will be most
beneficial to creditors, debtors, and prospective business
venturers
.
C. REVIEW OF THE WORK ALREADY PORE BY OTHERS
The only information that is similar to this work
is a pamphlet that was published In 1952.“ That report
consists primarily of a critical analysis of the causes of
bankruptcy and the determination of the relative Importance
of these various causes.
The Information presented in that report was se-
cured from a detailed analysis of 570 commercial bankrupt-
cies. The only cases included in this report originated
and were settled in the bankruptcy court. In each case
creditors suffered a loss on claims.
The study covers the twelve year period, 1920 to
1951. It discusses commercial failures in general, nature
p Sadd, V. and Williams, R.T., Causes of Commercial
Bankruptcies
, Wo. 69 > in Domestic C omme rce £er le s , fcd -b3
,
U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1932.
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and characteristics of failures, general underlying
causes, consequences of these failures and suggested
remedies. There follows a discussion of each of the ten
major causes of failures which are supplemented by tables
and charts. These tables disclose the causes of failures
in the owners’ and in the creditors’ opinion and lists
these causes from the most important to the least important
The last part of the report includes a great deal
of statistical material pertaining to such matters as, dis-
tribution of 521 bankrupt commercial establishments accord-
ing to amount of capital invested at date of organization,
source and amount of capital invested, sales and credit
losses during year prior to failure, commercial experience
of bankrupts prior to the ownership of their business,
school education of commercial bankrupts, sex of commercial
bankrupts, citizenship of commercial bankrupts, and number
of dependents of commercial bankrupts,
D. METHOD OF APPROACH
In order to present as clear an analysis as possible
the problem has been broken down into ten separate phases,
each year constituting one phase. Each of the ten years in
turn was sub-divided into two parts, “analysis of failures'*
and "causes of failures.” The “analysis of failures' 1 is
mainly a statistical picture of the failures, while the
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5"causes of failures" lists and explains the reasons for
these failures. The analyses of failures are based upon
factual data derived from ? lDun * s Review . " On the other
hand, the causes of business failure are the writer’s own
opinions. He came to these conclusions after having care-
fully digested all the available written material on the
subject. More specifically, the material read by the
author is listed in the "bibliography" section of this
thesis.
An exhaustive study of the twelve months in each
year was made, gathering information concerning business
births and deaths, trends of business, and causes of business
failures. As a result of this type of monthly examination
it was possible to weave the data into reports covering
each of the ten years. A comparison was made of each year
to the previous one in a few of the more vital departments
such as, the increase or decrease in the number of failures
and the changes in the number of failures in the different
size groups. Tables have been prepared for each year per-
taining to the number of failures in each of the five main
industries, the size of failures, the amount of current
liabilities, the total amount of liabilities, and the ad-
justed and unadjusted Indexes of failure. Finally, the
material presented in each year has been summarized into an
overall picture of the ten year period.
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CHAPTER II
I. WHAT IS A BUSINESS FAILURE ?
A. DEFINITION
In view of the fact that material published by Dun
and Bradstreet, Inc. was used almost exclusively in com-
piling the data for this report, it seemed advisable to
give the definition of a business failure that Dun and
Bradstreet followed in determining its figures.
The problem of defining a business death is an ex-
tremely difficult one because it is confused by the process
of reincarnation. An obvious illustration in the incorpora
-
tion of a partnership. The partnership has disappeared from
the scene and a new concern canes into being. From a credit
point or view, a new status has been made. On the other
hand, from the point of view of the flow of goods, or of em-
ployment, or of service to customers, the change might be
merely one of legal form. 1
This problem may be carried one step further.
Suppose that one individual proprietor sells hi3 business
to another individual owner. There may be no discontinuing
of the service given, no change in the type of operation.
Nevertheless, the ownership has undeniably changed. To
1 Dun’s Review, Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., March
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7make such a distinction possible Dun and Bradstreet
segregated as far as practicable those deaths which
o
did not involve a change in the dominant owners.
A business failure, according to Dun and Bradstreet
occurs
. . . when a commercial or industrial enter-
prise is involved in a court proceeding or in
a voluntary action which is likely to end in
loss to creditors. Specifically, the Dun and
Bradstreet record of failures includes discon-
tinuances following assignment, voluntary or invol-
untary petition in bankruptcy, attachment, exe-
cution, foreclosure, etc.; voluntary withdrawals
from business with known loss to creditors; also
enterprises involved in court action, such as re-
ceivership, and since June, 1934 , reorganization,
or arrangement, which may or may not lead to dis-
continuance; as well as businesses making volun-
tary compormises with creditors out of court.
The liabilities reported are primarily
current indebtedness, especially since the
elimination in 1935 of certain types of business
tending to have heavy deferred obligations. For
the purpose of the failure record current lia-
bilities are defined as including not only all
accounts and notes payable, but also all obli-
gations, whether in secured form or not, known
to be held by banks, officers, affiliated companies,
supplying companies, or the government.
1933 Revision-In 1933# failures of all
real estate, insurance, holding, and financial
companies, and of such concerns as steamship lines,
travel agencies, amusement places, etc., were eli-
minated from the record because of incomplete
coverage in those fields, and in order to make
the data more comparable with the types of con-
cerns listed in the Dun and Bradstreet Reference
Book. This change resulted in the lowering of
the 1933 total by 448 failures with liabilities
of $45,310,000.3
2 It)
3 Comparative Failure Trends : 1915 -25 , 1938-47 ,
Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., 19^6.
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BImportant legislation which affected the reporting
of failures was passed In August 1938. The Chandler Act
authorized the complete revision of the National Bankruptcy
Act for the first time since it was passed In 1898. The re-
sult was that the classification of corporate reorganizations,
which had been set up as a separate part of the failure re-
cords, could no longer be continued as a unit. Consequently,
applications for corporate reorganizations became an Inte-
4
gral part of the failure record.
1939 Revision - Prior to 1939 the failure
record did not include all voluntary dis-
continuances with loss to creditors or all
small concerns forced out of business by
attachments, executions, foreclosures, etc.,
with Insufficient assets to cover all claims.
Efforts to obtain complete coverage resulted
in addition of 3*360 failures with lia-
bilities of $14,316,000 to the 1939 record.''
B. DESCRIPTION
6
It is a common understanding that failure embraces
receivership and bankruptcy or some other form of legal assist-
ance. But this actually represents the final stage of failure.
^ Dun’s Review, Dun and Brads tree t, Inc., February,
1939* p. 3F:
6 Comparative Failure Trends : 1913 -23 , 1938 -47 , Dun &
Brad street 7 Inc . , 19^6
.
6 Starkweather, L.P., Whi Business Failures ? - No. 1,
Credit and Financial Management
, National Association of Credit
Men, Philadelphia, Penn., May 19*11, P* 20.
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9Economic or financial failure may have existed for a long
time, finally culminating in legal failure or insolvency.
The popular idea of failure too often confines itself solely
to the legal aspects of the problem.
In order to comprehend intelligently the failure
problem it is necessary to extend the conception of failure
to include the economic and financial phases. Consequently,
any complete description of business failure must cover the
problem in its three distinct stages:
1. Economic Failure
2. Financial Failure
5. Legal Failure or Insolvency.
Economic Failure
Economic failure does not require the suspension
of business activities nor does it suggest that losses to
creditors will be involved; neither does it mean the inability
to meet debt payments at maturity or that capital be impaired.
It regards a corporation or business enterprise as a failure
if its activities fail to satisfy an economic demand, or when
it may be definitely determined that profits offer inadequate
reward for the business risks assumed.
Financial Failure
A financial failure represents a circumstance in
which losses are the rule of the day and working capital be-
comes impaired. A business concern unable to show profitable
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operations as well as a sound working capital position may
be regarded as a financial failure.
A financial failure in its later stages is evidenced
by a large deficit in working capital. Such a company, how-
ever, may be solvent in terms of legal technicalities and
any condition of financial embarrassment or inadequate earn-
ing power may be only temporary in character. However, un-
less the underlying failure tendencies, operating first in
the form of economic failure and later in the form of fi-
nancial failure, are definitely corrected, the concern must
of necessity proceed to the third stage, namely, that of
legal Mlure or insolvency.
Legal Failure
A legal failure is bankruptcy which is defined under
the Federal Bankruptcy Act as a state of insolvency
. . . when the aggregate of the property .
. . at a fair valuation is not sufficient
in amount to pay debts.'
This legal concept of failure assumes that no firm
has failed until it has been forced into a legal settlement
of its affairs. It is obvious, however, that a concern might
have been an economic and financial failure for many years
while still remaining legally solvent. Nevertheless, a dis-
7 See Federal Bankruptcy Act.
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tinction of this sort is not feasible because of the pos-
sibility of a variety of interpretations. There are no
established standards for a definite, clear-cut segrega-
tion of failures into the economic and financial stages.
The legal failure, on the other hand, is universally
understood and approved, and has explicit guides for its
determination. Therefore, the most practicable solution,
and the one used in this report, is to consider a business
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CHAPTER III
I. CAUSES OF BUSINESS FAILURES
A. TYPES OF CAUSES
The© are various causes which interact and cumulate
to force a bankruptcy. It rarely happens that a single cause
precipitates bankruptcy or liquidation. There are, in
nearly all cases of a failed business, several causes for
each case
.
These causes of business failures are divided into
two parts; underlying or fundamental causes and occasion or
immediate causes. Fundamental causes are those real causes
which are present year after year, and which are basically
responsible for eventually leading to the discontinuance of
an enterprise. The immediate causes, such as business de-
pressions, are usually the “occasion" rather than the funda-
mental "cause" of business failures. While business depres-
sions may not be disregarded in a study of the bankruptcy
and failure problem, many other factors are of far greater
importance. The underiylng causes of business failure so im-
pair the strength of a concern that it is unable to meet
the adjustments demanded during a business depression. Neg-
lect on the part of the individual, as well as neglect and
lack of foresight upon the part of management, represents
the fundamental cause of subsequent failure. The strain of
a general depression in business merely reveals underlying
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failure tendencies and maladjustments in the human, as well
as the corporate body. This strain, while exposing the
underlying weaknesses, is not in itself responsible for
financial embarrassment, receivership with reorganization
and reconstruction, or on the other hand, hopeless bank-
ruptcy with "death 11 and liquidation.^
A discussion of causes of business failures neces-
sarily includes both types of causes. However, the general
underlying causes, if listed in the text, would be the same
for each year. They are, therefore, detailed in this chap-
ter to obviate repeating them. On the other hand, because
of the very nature of immediate causes, they are peculiar
to the failures in each particular year. Consequently,
only these causes are presented in the main body of this
thesis as they, unlike the underlying causes, are subject
to change due to shifting economic conditions.
b. general underlying causes
The following are the general underlying or funda-
mental causes of business failures in the order of their
importance j 2
1 Starkweather, L.P., ISa. Businesses Fall? Credit
and Financial Management , National Association of Credit Men,
Philadelphia, PennT, May 19^ 1> pp. 8-11.
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The lack of efficient management is a cause of
failure in the vast majority of unsuccessful enter-
prises. This inefficiency is brought about by im-
proper accounting records, insufficient scholastic
training and lack of diversified ability.
2. Insufficient Capital
The real cause is the lack of ability to manage
effectively the capital available for use. It is gen-
erally true that most concerns fall because of the incom-
petent manner in which the owners or managers use the
capital they have, rather than for lack of capital. The
average concern usually gets into difficulty on account
of granting and accepting too much credit. This cause
should properly be termed "abuse of capital" rather than
"insufficient capital." It is not the amount of capital
available at the inception of the business, but efficiency
of management that is important. A large amount of capital
only delays the failure if management is inefficient.
3 . Business Depression
Every analysis of business failure made in the past
has proved that other causes were more fundamental and
influential than a business depression. It Is probable
that the larger proportion of failures result from bad
judgment shown at the very beginning of the business.
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The greater number of enterprises which are
launched and later become bankrupt have no economic
justification, and lack the essentials of successful
operation. In most cases it could hardly be expected
that anything short of a miracle would enable them to
avoid failure and a temporary lull in business acti-
vities serves only to accelerate the movement toward
an inevitable discontinuance.
4. Bad Debt Losses
Failure to appraise ability and character in
credit transactions is nearly always fatal. Securing
an increased volume of sales by indiscriminate credit
granting is oftentimes ruinous, and promiscuous credit
extension during times of "easy" money has brought
about the undoing of many enterprises.
5* Intensified Competition
Competition determines the fate of industries as
well as the firms that survive within an industry. The
most efficient and well-operated companies generally
survive. Competition serves to eliminate the inefficient
and unqualified from business, but unfortunately their
places are taken by others equally inefficient and un-
qualified. Lack of sufficient ability, resources,
and opportunity to overcome existing competition is a
frequent cause of failure, but in many other cases the
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inability of certain established firms to duplicate
the progressive activities of new and better qualified
competition is a cause of failure.
6. Adverse Domestic and Personal Factors
The inability to overcome bad personal habits is
a primary cause of failure . Extravagance , intem-
perance, indolence, gambling, and other related habits
are a few of the difficulties. Illness, medical ex-
pense, and wasteful habits of the bankrupt’s own family
are other sources of bankruptcy.
7. Dishonesty and Fraud
The intention of a dishonest debtor in a fraudulent
bankruptcy case is to secure as much merchandise as
possible on credit, dispose of it without paying creditor^
and then to secure a bankruptcy discharge.
8. Decline in Value of Assets
The decline in value of assets has not been offset
by a corresponding reduction in amount of liabilities ac-
crued against the depreciated assets, and businesses wifti-
out adequate reserves have been forced to extreme measures
in order to fulfill creditor obligations.
9. Excessive Overhead Expense
Overhead expenses (rent and salaries are generally
the largest items) are not in proportion to the volume
of sales. Excessive overhead costs iB a good indication
:
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10. Inefficient and Dishonest Employees
Unauthorized withdrawal of money or merchandise
from a business by the employees has been a contri-
buting or primary cause of failure in many insolvencies.
11. Other Causes
a. Poor location, especially for retailers.
b. Buying too much on credit is often a fault
of an untrained merchant, who finds it diffi-
cult to resist the high-pressure salesmanship
of salesmen, with no interest in the success
of a business, but only in his increased com-
missions .
c. Excessive interest charges on borrowed funds.
If interest charges are greater than the average
profit for the particular line of trade, failure
is certain
d. Unwarranted expansion.
e. In real estate and building, losses from specu-
lation are an important cause of failure
.
f. Freedom of enterprise.
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CHAPTER IV
I. CLASSIFICATION CF GENERAL UNDERLYING CAUSES OF
BUSINESS FAILURES*
The underlying causes for business failures given in
the previous cahpter were listed but ungrouped • The pur-
pse of this section is to group the major reasons for business
failures under three broad classifications. These results
were obtained from an examination of more than a hundred com-
mercial crashes and from interviews of men who were familiar
with the details of ten times that many failures. According




b. Living beyond means.
c. A desire to get rich quickly.
d. Bad habits.
2. Executive Reasons.
a. Lack of executive capacity.
b. Bad executive methods.
3. Management Reasons.
a. Outworn policies.
b. Improper organization set-ups.
1 Murphy, J. A., Why Businesses Fall , Sales Management ,
Sales Management, Inc., New York, March 1, 19^07 pp. IB-20 and




a; a ©via eeiJL/Ifei eeenisud 10 I aeeuao ^ni^Xiebau ui7
~*l
.
odT . jboQiioiani/ tud r> ’
88era ex/d -sot enoBu^i •xotsra qxio-'is oi at aoJtjfo&a eixi^ to sec-
BiXuft*? ©eeriT ..BOOi^BOitieealo Jbao'xcf ©feoricf %ebuu e«uol ,
~ EDO o J')6'ifuu?ri « OBitt 8‘IOflv to aoitoaXiru X -* t,o merit .r-iuv
lAlilcif-t ?)!•.
-v orlv am to «;w >1 vs h.iai sco^l Ixib 8©dBa*xo I^lO'iea
-
r
i ^fi£xa iaOcf Boaiicf ciKt to alieist) ©rl* Otftw











eas ">l zm 3fj':v;.J ,d
.v.i. o:. oia t 0 orf **ttef c<
. V- 1 ./>
. ,
- •. v
1 j ,: . 3
. v.i 1 .o e . i *u
o
«r. . ‘ o :% o*w , j:
.
}.<..' \y: vlii/oex- > hi
. sao e.a d/L •'a oj. . ..in t.
.
, a ; j.LOt: M 1QW 4 i/ ; •
*ec--; -
1





>bl * QQ 7&WI t-I Hb'ifiTT ~J i"7« *.4 asiiieg£aaM esIaS






c. Poor coordination of the operative
functions of the business.
d. Interference from outsiders.
e. Outmoded sales management.
f. Insufficient advertising.
g. Failure to keep up with competition.
Of the above classifications, the first applies to
small failures but seldom to large ones. The second and
third divisions apply to sizable failures, much larger than
those resulting from personal reasons.
Personal Reasons
The proprietor of a small business in most cases has
insufficient capital and is inexperienced; that is, not
thoroughly versed in the fine points of business and finance.
The shortcomings usually lead him to speculation in the
stock market, speculation in inventories, betting on horses,
or simply taking "chances" in his business without having
given proper consideration to his actions. It is by these
means that the small owner attempts to compensate for h^s
deficiencies in business acument. The result is that he
succeeds only in paving the way for the eventual failure of
his enterprise.
Thousands of concerns that went under in the early 1950 ’s
did so not because the businesses themselves were unprofitable,
but because they had been bled to death financing their
proprietor’s speculations. These men not only withdrew the
ei
svlXi/iaqo ©liX
. e t. aI ?. i 'ite lo et i^oi ./..
. U'lfvM. tjJO iiK- 'll i: oc -is/iislnl
. )









‘ O • • •
.aoiXlfreqnoo dfrtw QU c







B&dfr ‘xag'iai sioua taattuIXat felctesle ofr ^Iqqb aoolBlvXJb teldfr
! 2 i. ;'c ino*i1 galfrlues*! saotifr




8 i5fi ;68bo frsod a! k ? X’ X BUG II.'.uis a Xo *xofr eX'tro'iQ edT
$ou % el Xarifr t&aoael'xeqxeaJi ei tea laXl'-so fraalMlttfaaX
«90(uatt baa easalejjcf lo sfraloq :. b©8*l©v
^1 ai rol^L. j .f . 'ofr . ; 'm i zllx^hu .-• jil soofricdc : riT
t s aenoii ao galfrfrod t edlio^aevchi adlfraXJuoBqa ifreafun lioofrs
l:utv&£l fruorifrlw b^xLlKsjd aid at “esoaati©" galJCaX \;Ic te -:o
eaedfr ^d el XI .SBOffroa iB -yi bioaos 'xeqo'xq aevlg












. .. 'JO'. ...
. * r£i\\, fiifi
&*0&I fliae orifr cil •:.. . >, 1 ' ’ . • •> lo ateaavodT
. XXlQiqnjj e*xav aevXeanieild ace ear. It. j<1 adX e&uapecf fron oa Mb
'
edfr wo'ibdXlw rlno ion a^i eaeriT « oao t XiXuoeqe a 1 ioXslTcqortq
20
profits from their companies but in many instances they also
cut into their capital. In addition, they neglected their
work, and gave their time, attention, and interest to some
elusive "get rich quick" scheme which they were following.
Many small businesses fail because their owners live
beyond their means. Owners do not put themselves on a
salary that the company can afford to pay. Instead they draw
funds for all their personal needs out of the business and
before long ts capital has been very seriously impaired.
A mistake that is made by many samll business men is
in trying to support too many relative; being generous to
a fault; ear-ring too big a load. More businessmen fail be-
cause they cannot say *No" to friends, salesmen, and relatives,
than because of drinking or playing the horses. Thus personal
habits are not so important a factor in commercial failures
as are thepersonal characteristics of businessmen.
Executive Reasons
The lack of executive ability is probably responsible
for most discontinuances. A good executive has the ability
to face facts and to do something about them. Significantly,
poor businessmen are seldom capable of doing this. Either
they ignore facts or delay acting on them until it is too
late. These poor businessmen do not have the ability to
09
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foresee catastrophes and cannot adapt their enterprises to
meet them. They do not know the line of business well enough.
Executives of a company must know that line thoroughly. The
persons who succeed in a line are generally experts at it.
Those who fall in a business are often novices in it and lack
sufficient knowledge to operate the concern properly.
Another necessary executive qualification is the ability
to keep adjusting a business to the constant requirements of
change. Today an executive who is not able to readjust his
business so that it can keep step with htese evolutionary
changes is severely handicapped.
Many large organizations do not have enough executives
or executives of the right type, who are properly trained
and who have the right experience. Obviously, such a con-
dition of executive inefficiency leads to ultimate discon-
tinuance .
Management .Reasons
Delegating authority is an absolutely essential quali-
fication for leadership in business. The head of a firm
may get along without it while his firm is of medium size,
but he cannot get along without it when the company needs an
organization in order to operate.
Nearly all mangement failures have had organization set-
ups where there was a structural relationship between the
various factors in these enterprises. The man heading the
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enterprise invariably lacks the ability to train assistants
and to give them authority. That is one of the most de-
cided weaknesses in businessmen, and probably does more to
keep them from growing than any other deficiency they may
have. This is the reason why businesses that start big
seldom succeed. Chain stores are successful because by
reason of slow growth they are able to educate executives
for the expansion of the enterprise. The business that
starts big does not have the company-trained executives to
carry them on.
Another important management reason for business casual-
ties is the failure to keep up with competition. A wise
management continually wonders what its competitors are doing,
not only that it may be able to keep up with but that it may
keep ahead of its competition. Consideration must be given
to the competitor's activities in the field of new products,
the redesign of old products, new methods of manufacture,
and to his advertising and sales-promotional wcfrk.
A constant check on the trade papers for the industry,
a sales force that contains good listeners as well as good
talkers to pick up bits of information from the trade, and
a management that cooperates with the trade association are
all that is required to keep a company abreast of the com-
petitive picture.
Management must keep in constant touch with the industry
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in order to be cognizant of competitive improvements,
and also to receive suggestions for improvements in its
own production and sales activities.
Banker control is another influence that accounts for
some of the failures. Frequently bankers interfere too
much with the management of the business.
In conclusion it may be said that in the final analysis
of reasons for business failures, whether they be big or
little, it will be found that the lack of executive ability,
in one degree or another, on the part of the operating
heads, has something to do with most of them.
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CHAPTER V
I. BUSINESS FAILURES IN 1938
A. ANALYSIS OF FAILURES
The year 1938, as a whole with respect to failures
was similar to 1934 and 1935 • The rise in failures in this
year was industry-wide and country-wide.
The total number of failures of 12,836 represented
a 35$ increase over 1937 and was the first appreciable rise
in the annual total In five years. It was a departure from
a downward trend in evidence, since the peak of 51*822
cases in 1932. The amount of liabilities also increased
after several years of decline. Current liabilities like-
wise rose and these included accounts payable, obligations,
secured or not, knowD to be held by banks, officers, af-
filiated companies, or the Government. In addition to the
$246,000,000 liabilities of this sort, there was in 1938
a total of $89*000,000 in mortgages arri funded debt held by
the public in companies whose financial difficulties were
recorded in the courts in 1938.
^
The sharp rise in failures in the latter part of
1937 continued into the first three months of 1938, and the
new high level was maintained until the closing months of
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October, but not until a big drop occurred in November was
there any indication that the end -of- the -year level would
be below that at the end of 1937*^
With the exception of a drop in Kay and a rise in
June which practically balanced each other, the adjusted
index, which is a measurement of business failures adjusted
for seasonal variation, had 3tayed close to 60 since the
beginning of the year. This seemed to indicate that 1938
failures had been on a pretty even keel and had reflected
little change other than that of seasonal variation.
The total liabilities generally showed a tendency
to decline except for sharp increases in March and December.
These upturns were due to the increased failures in the
large-size group, with liabilities of $25,000 to $100,000,
and the very large-size group, with liabilities over $100,
000 . Otherwise the total amount of liabilities per month
hovered around $19,000,000.
During the year the small and medium size failures,
with liabilities under $25,000, made up about 90$ of the
total. However, the higher level of failures this year
had been increasingly at the expense of larger companies.
In fact the larger the company, the higher the rate of
failure
.
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and medium size failures and a steadily decreasing propor-
tion of large failures. There was some $10,000,000 annually
involved in the failure of thousands of small companies
with liabilities under $5,000 each.
In the retail and wholesale trade large failures
increased, but in manufacturing, construction and commercial
service the entire 1938 increase was among small enterprises.
In the year under consideration the business group
principally affected -was retail trade, particularly furniture
and house furnishings, apparel shops, general merchandise
stores and automotive products.
The increased failures in manufacturing and the
wholesale trade in 1938 was but the continuation of a gradual
rise which started in 1937
•
The difficulties in the apparel trade were traceable
back through the wholesale trade and manufacturing by an
84$ irse in failures of clothing wholesalers, and a 45$ in-
crease in failures of manufacturers of textile products
including clothing. In manufacturing there were also large
increases in four other lines; Iron and steel products,
machinery, chemicals and drugs and forest products. In
the important group of food manufacturers, failures dropped
10$.
The majority of the consturction failures were a-
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B. CAUSES OF FAILURES
During the first half of 1928, there was a leveling
off in industrial and commercial activity. This course
of business reflected the conservative attitude of inves-
tors and buyers. With buyers marking time, watching for
the first indications of stabilization in commodity prices,
no incentive for a sharp reversal of trend was offered to
industry
.
Operations continued to fluctuate idly around 30$
of capacity. On the whole there was no prospect of an im-
3
mediate advance in demand.
Further curtailment of consumer incomes both in
rural and industrial areas resulted in a decline in consumer
buying and retail prices with a consequent lower dollar
volume of trade. Foreign business, which accounted for
more than 60$ of the total business, took a downturn be-
cause of the tension prevailing in Europe.
Probably the main cause of failures in 1928, was
the very environment of low business activity, because
failures rise in period of business depresssions and de-
cline as business improves. An example of this can be seen
in the failure of several large companies which were es-
tablished before 1900 by the fathers or grandfathers of the
^ Dunts Review
,
Dun and Brad street, Inc., March 1928,




• b1I®v©1 io 8£v ©'Xfert^ to 11 all .trai l art













< dX'U \‘ ‘ •' - oo n’ . o t
1
’ Xlo'ete \o S‘-Oi'.«oi. rn :







f)u ( ' 0 f 3 ' --t- ' 1
al rltocf ccetoonl *X€>sof8^t>0 1® -
t« n.. aoo , : enllosb ,• i t b I - £ i tov-is laMtcubcX - le™
1
*





eew %8$gl ni eeauIX.el to ©euro alanx ©rlt ^Icfado-i?










- • **&>*&& r: sent cud sb f*tUo
«.s* «aew nolriw celnaqrao© «$***$ Is-iovue lo
©atfXitol «*** at




01X01 ;XJ ,€ """ 1”L ',fc '
.
* oL,a tssiisi ?h£ ^
,
28
present owners. New interests providing funds had in
some cases entered the management. The others were
still family affairs. Probably until 1929* they had var-
ious experiences during the depression which depleted
the working capital and then in 1938, they were unable to
pay RFC loans, accrued interest and mortgage requirements,
4
or even current accounts.
Most of the firms failing in 1938, were carrying
very extensive liabilities which included RFC loans, heavy
bank indebtedness and many thousands of dollars to trade
creditors
.
In September of 1938, business relaxed and displayed
greater confidence as the Four-Power Agreement ended the
nervous tensions brought about by fears of war. Although
business activity improved and recovery proceeded cautiously
in the latter half of 1938, there was still a considerable
number of failures. The circumstances that accounted for
the existing state of affairs were: 1. The war scare and
its unsettling effect. 2. Over-optimism engendered by the
"Munich Peace." 3» Domestic labor troubles.
Another cause of business failures in 1938, was that
companies were going into business with insufficient capital
and during a period of business uncertainty and falling
^ Dun’s Review, Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., Anril
1938, pp.“3^38.
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industrial production. Many of the failing companies had
incorporated after 1950, and started with an invested
capital of $25,000 and less. These companies had no in-
debtedness other than trade accounts or loans when they
failed, indicating that they had not been able to sus-
tain even small losses through slowly moving goods. In
order to stay in business they had been forced to borrow
capital; but their loans increased to such an extent that
if finally caused their failure.
Firms also became insolvent in 1958, because the
turnover in the business population was at an all time
high due to depressed business conditions. Every year
witnesses the ambitious start of thousands of new enter-
prises and at the same time the death of thousands of
others. Such was the case in 1958, when the number of
firms in operation increased. Because of these additions,
especially during this period of adverse business activity,
there was an increased number of failures.
Other causes of business failures were curtailed
operations on small profit margins, competition, and slow
receivables. The large construction failures were largely
due to speculative real estate and building operations by
the contractors engaged in the construction industry.
Lastly, the fundamental causes of business failures, pre-
viously mentioned, were in operation taking their heavy
toll of firms.
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I. BUSINESS FAILURES IN 1939
A. ANALYSIS of failures
The trend of industrial and commercial failures
during 1939, was gradually downward, and the year ended with
a definitely declining movement.
Following the break in business recovery in the
latter part of 1937 , failures rose sharply and were on a re-
latively high level throughout 1938. The 1939 figures in-
dicated about a 50$ recovery in the failure record. Where-
as the number of failures declined 11$ in 1939, the decrease
in liabilities amounted to 32$, and the total fell below
that of both 1938 and 1937
•
1
The 1939 trend of failures followed the normal seasonal
pattern very closely. Not for many years had there been
such an absence of factors which disturb the usual month
to month course of business, defaults. The increased
business activity in 1939 did not have a drastic effect
upon the failure record. In fact, throughout the year
there had been a gradual, though not uninterrupted, down-
ward trend. The general level of failures was below that
of a year previous.
The course of the index since the beginning of
the year had been smoothly and continuously downward ex-
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cept for a slight rise in April and a sharp rise in October
and November. The even course of the adjusted index in-
dicated that no untoward influences had been brought to
bear upon the failure record. The insolvency index adjusts
for the varying number of working days in the months, and
also takes into account the increasing or decreasing num-
ber of concerns in business, as determined by the number
of names in the Dun and Brad street Reference Book . The in-
dex is expressed as the apparent annual number of failures
in each 10,000 companies in business.
The trend in evidence since 1934, of a slow but
steady increase in the proportion of small failures and
a corresponding decrease in the proportion of large failures
was continued in 1939
•
For the first time in nearly two years the number
of very small failures in March of 1939* exceeded those
in the medium size group. This lasted until August when
the medium size failures were once again greater than the
small failures. However, the two groups togehter, that
is all failures with liabilities under $25,000, continued
to constitute nearly 90$ of the entire failure record in
1939.
The trend in the five main industry groups was gen-
erally downward for the year. Manufacturing failures fluc-
tuated during the twelve months but on the whole took a
slight dip. The wholesale trade on the other hand indi-
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cat.ed a definite decreasing tendency. The retail trade
failures also were reduced considerably. In the last
two groups, const.urction and commercial service, there was
very little change.
In the Individual businesses there were increased
failures during the year in paper, printing, and publish-
ing, and chemicals and drugs in the manufacturing in-
dustry. There were also notable increases in the lumber,
building materials, and hardware in the wholesale trade,
and in the construction field there was an upturn in failures
in general construction. The year 1939 also presented de-
creases in various businesses 3uch as farm products, foods,
groceries, clothing and furnishing, and supply houses in
the wholesale trade, and farm supplies and general stores,
general merchandise, and apparel in the retail industry.
£. CAUSES OP FAILURES
During the first naif of 1939 business activity
was in a depressed condition but took on a healthier tone
in the second half of theyear. However, this slight re-
covery was not sufficient to appreciably decrease the num-
ber of failures. The unfavorable environment of this per-
iod continued to be the dominant factor in the high level
of failures as business activity has a direct bearing on
business deaths. There is almost no lag between a slowing
down of business activity and an increas in failures.
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One of the main causes of business failures in 1959>
was the conservative attitude of business men toward busi-
ness risks. Their lack of confidence was evident because
of a general hesitancy in placing orders and in expanding
output. Commercial and industrial buyers had restricted
their purchases to current needs. In industry and trade,
emphasis was placed on cautious purchasing policies and
on inventory control.
In the first half of 1939> the chief factors that
tended to depress business activity and to cause large
failures appeared to be non-economic
,
that is, psychological
and political. Repeated threats of an international con-
flict had created in many business men a state of mind
characterized by strain and uncertainty. The domestic
situation had been somewhat clouded by the fact that busi-
ness men were taking a less optimistic view of prospec-
tive cooperation between government and business. Other
causes of failures in the first six months were the de-
cline in steel orders and the shutdown of the bituminous
coal mines pending settlement of the dispute over a new
labor contract.
Although business recovered in the second half of
1959 through the settlement of the coal strike, an advance
in security prices, a revival of trade activity, new acti-
vity in the construction industry and expansion of steel
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output, it could not be sustained. This was due to the
existence of a weakness in whole slae commodity prices and
the financial uncertainties resulting from recurrent inter-
national crises. These had an unsettling effect on the
businessmen "s attitude and persuaded them that progress
must be made in a cautious manner. Consequently, business
failures decreased in the last six months but not to any
great extent.
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I. BUSINESS FAILURES IN 1940
a. analysis of failures
The industrial and commercial failures dropped
for the second successive year. The reported failures
during 1940, totaled 13,619, as compared with 14,768,
in 1939* This was a decline of 8 per cent following an 11
per cent decrease between 1958 and 1959, but in spite of
the downward trend the 1940 level did not reach the pre-
vious low established in 1937*
There was a sharp rise in failures in the early
part of the year accompanied by falling business activity.
After the upturn in business in May, the momentum of rising
failures carried them upward for three more months. How-
ever, by September continually Improving business caused
failures to decline sharply and continuously through the
remainder of the year. x
The total current liabilities and the total lia-
bilities declined slightly from 1959, but were the lowest
since 1919* A comparison of the Indexes, unadjusted and
adjusted, revealed that the figures for eachnonth in 1940
were lower than the figures for corresponding months in
1959* The trend of failures during the year, as indicated
by the insolvency index, departed widely from the normal
seasonal pattern.
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most idential with that of the 1939 failures. Of the
total in 1940, 90 . 6$ consisted of failures with lia-
bilities under $ 25 , 000 ; 7.8$ was made up of conerns with
debts between $25,000 and $100,000; and 1.6$ were very
large failures of $100,000 and over. Among the overwhetoi-
ing number of the fdlures under $25,000 however, there was
a tendency away from the medium ones with debts of between
$5,000 and $25,000 toward the small ones with debts of
less than $5,000. This was substantiated by the fact that
the only percentage increase in failures from 1939 to 1940ms
in the small failures under $5,000, an increase of 6$.
The medium size failures showed a 21$ decrease, while the
large and very large ones, respectively, demonstrated 7$
and 2$ decreases. The actual number of very large failures
with debts in excess of $100,000 had decreased steadily
year by year since the peak in 1934. In 1940 manufacturing
concerns were responsible for about 65$ of the very large
failure s
.
In the year under consideration the decrease in
failures extended through four of the five main industry
groups, construction being the exception. Commercial
service failures and those in the retail trade groups were
down less, however, than either manufacturing or whole-
sale trade failures. Failures in wholesale trade dropped
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trade failure declines amounted to only 4 and 8 per cent,
2
respectively .
Decreases in eight out of the twelve manufacturing
groups ranged from 6 percent in paper printing, and pub-
lishing to 51 per cent in stone, clay, ,and glass products.
There were increases only in forest products, chemicals and
drugs, fuels, and transportation equipment. In the last
three months of the year, when failures customarily rise,
fewer manufacturing failures were evident in most lines.
Apparently the manufacturers, who are the first to receive
substantial benefits from any new prosperity, were already
being favorably affected by the new demands stimulated by
increased Government orders for defense purposes.
Wholesale trade failures resisted throughout the
first seven months of the year any seasonal downward pull.
Normal rises in September and October were followed by a
drop in November. Failures in all lines except fuels,
however, totalled less than in 1959*
Retail trade failures were seasonally high during
the summer months. Increased consumer buying in the fall,
however, forestalled the usual increase in the number of
retail trade failures toward the end of the year. Annual
failures in individual retail lines were down from 1 to 20
per cent from comparable 1959 figures. Food failures went
2 Ibid., p. 42.
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down 6 per cent, apparel shops 16 per cent, restaurants
and drugs only slightly off. Lumber, building materials,
and hardware failures remained about the same. In com-
mercial service increased failures were reported among
cleaners and dyers and in trucking lines.
£. CAUSES OF FAILURES
From August 1940, to the end of the year, business
activity was sharply on the upswing because of an in-
crease in actual Government commitments for defense, an
increase in consumer income and in consumer buying, and a
rise in Industrial production and in trade activity. How-
ever, until August of 1940 business conditions were lethar-
gic due to an apathetic buying interest, low industrial
production, and employment difficulties. This unhealthy
environment was once again the cause of many business
failures
.
War psychology ruled the buying policies of business
men until late in the year when the domestic program of de-
fense had begun to offset unfavorable foreign developments.
The war in Holland and Belgium had an adverse affect on
business, and caused the exports of U. S. merchandise to
suffer a sharp contraction in April. In addition, there
was a sharp drop in stock prices because of nervous trading
due to the war. These psychological and political fac-
tors were responsible for a large number of failures in
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MaDy firms were in existence in 1940, in spite of
the fact that business was not good during most of the
year. A3 in all periods of contraction competition was
very keen for the less-than-normal demands of buyers. This
resulted in the inefficient firms being forced out of
operation.
In addition to the immediate causes listed above,
there were at work the fundamental causes, making their
presence felt a3 always.
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I. BUSINESS FAILURES IN 1941
A. ANALYSIS OF FAILURES
The industrial and commercial failures totalled
11,848 in 1941, a decline of 1,771 failures, or 15$,
from the 15 >619 reported in 1940. Thus during the three
years, 1959* 1940 and 1941, there was a gradual falling
off in the annual number of failures, with the rate of
decline Increasing in 1941 and 1940.
The month-to-month trend was downward during the
greater part of the year. Continued and substantial de-
creases near the end of the year carried the insolvency
index to a point not only under the 1940 lower limit, but
even below the previous low in January 1957*
^
The prevailing tendency among failures in 1941, was
one of decreasing numbers among large concerns, while,
except for seasonal influences, the very small under-
financed units passed out of the picture at about the
usual rate. Consequently the number of failures had not
dropped so low in relation to the past record, a3 had lia-
bilities which were about 22$ below those in 1940.
A glance at the failure record revealed a definite,
well-marked decline of 27$ in the number of failures among
1 Dun <3 Review
, Dun aDd Bradstreet, Inc., February
1942, p, 51.
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concerns with liabilities of over $100,000. A decline
of almost equal proportions, approximately 24$, took
place among failures with liabilities between $5 ,000
and $100,000. Among the small failures, however, only
a 2$ decline from 1940 was noted.
The most appreciable changes from 1940 levels were
in manufacturing and wholesaling trade, where failures
dropped about 20$ in each group. In comparison with these
declines, retail trade failures were down only 11$ from
their 1940 total, and construction and commercial service
failures only 7$ and 9^> respectively.
Textile mills, with a drop in production of 6l$,
headed the list of industries in which failures were very
much lower in 1941 than in 1940. Failures among producers
of textile mill products, paper products, and iron and
steel products showed an unusually sharp drop in the last
p
quarter of 1941.
Retail trade failures were affected favorably by
a combination of increased demand and rising prices.
Failures among automobile accessory stores were cut nearly
in baLf. Men’s and women's wearing apparel failures drop-
ped about 53$ • Hardware and paint stores, furniture stores,
and food stores and restaurants, which at the end of the
first half of the year had experienced more failures than
in the first half of 1940, ended the year wth decreases.
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as the result of rapidly falling failures in the last
quarter. Two lines, automobiles and building materials,
3
ended the year with more failures than in 19^0.
B. CAUSES OF FAILURES
In this period of defense preparations there was
present an influence that operated toward the closing of
small businesses, either in hand trades or other lines,
because of the drafting into the service of the owners.
Wot all of these discontinuances were failures, but there
was a tendency toward stepping out from under an embarras-
sing financial load through bankruptcy so that the slate would
be clean upon later return to business.
There was an increase in the number of failures be-
cause of closing due to the inability to secure either
material for manufacture or finished goods for distri-
bution. The shortage was particularly felt in the non-
defense companies as the needs for defense increased.
Another cause of failure was the change-over from
consumer goods to defense schedules because of its atten-
dant difficulties. Some firms which could not convert
from civilian to war products also found their way into
the failure record.
The number of firms in operation in 19^1, decreased
midway through the year, but then Increased sharply in
5 Ibid
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the latter part of 19^1. This increase in the number
of firms in operation far exceeded the total warranted
by the amount of business recovery. The usual result
of too many companies competing for insufficient busi-
ness came about, forcing the incompetent firms to quit.
Lastly, priorities and rationing had begun to
assume increased importance and were partly responsible
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I. BUSIES SS FAILURES IE 19^2
A. ANALYSIS OF FAILURES
The year 19^2 witnessed a total of 9*^05 business
failures, a decline of 21$ from the number in 19^1* and
the lowest annual total since 1919- Failures followed a
generally declining trend during the entire year. In
the last six months however, the drop was unusually sharp,
and monthly failures reached the lowest level on record
in relation to the total number of concerns in business. 1
The current liabilities of $ 100 , 763*000 and the
total liabilities of $109*102,000 represented in each case
a drop of 26$ over the previous year. The current liabil-
ities was the smallest amount of potential credit losses
through business Mlures since 1919* There had been a
continuous decline in the annual totals of current lia-
bilities since the billion dollar peak in 1932.
The unadjusted and adjusted indexes averaged about
ten points lower in 19^2 than in 1941. Each month of the
year saw a sharp drop over the corresponding month of the
previous year.
Small failures with liabilities under $5,000
declined steadily throughout the year ending with a total that
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was 25$ less than the figure for 19^1. The other groups
declined also but not as consistently as the group al-
ready mentioned. The medium, large, and very large size
classes depicted diminutions of 14, 19 and 25$, respec-
tively. Once again the failures under $25,000 accounted
for over 90$ of the total number of failures.
In the three main industry groups, manufacturing,
retail trade, and wholesale trade, failures were about
25$ lower in 19^2 than in 19^1. In commercial service
there was only a slight decline of 7$, while in construction
an increase of about 1$ was noted.
RetlaL failures showed little decline until the
latter part of the year. In the spring and summer months
concerns went out of business in increasing numbers in
such lines as building materials, hardware, furniture and
house furnishings, drugs, and automotive products. In
the last few months of the year however, a decided falling
off in failures in these businesses was seen, together
with a continuing decline in food and general merchandise
2
stores and apparel shops.
Manufacturing failures declined sharply early in
the year, rose during the mid -summer months, and then
dropped to low levels in the last third of the year.
Trends in the most important manufacturing lines were very
2 Ibid.
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inconsistent from month to month. Pood failures and
textile failures generally followed the above-mentioned
trend, but failures of paper and printing concerns, high
in the early part of the year and low in the summer
months, showed signs of rising again at the end of the
year. Furniture manufacturing faioures also turned up
toward the close of the year. Iron, steel, and machinery
3failures declined steadily after the early months.
The shift in emphasis to immediate war production
as against future facilities brought additional cur-
tailment to the war construction program, increasing
total construction suspensions by December 19^2 to around
$2,000,000,000. With three-fifths of the $28,000,000,000
war consturction program completed by the end of October,
building tapered off but still remained at a high level.
B. CAUSES of failures
Among the reasons for a smaller number of failures
in war time were :
1. Increased business activity and purchasing
power which kept in business concerns which might normally
have gone out .
2. A rapidly declining business birth rate which
kept out of the picture many companies which otherwise
5 Ibid.
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would have gone into business and quickly closed. The
early years in business are the most hazardous for new
enterprises and it is probably not a mere coincidence
that an accelerated drop in failures follows a sharp
decline in the business birth rate.
3. The great adaptability of manufacturers to
change over to war work.
Although business deaths declined very noticeably,
there were still 9>^05 concerns that found their way into
the failure record. Many small businesses failed be-
cause large operators were swelling their inventories
while small operators either stayed as they were or
decreased. Small manufacturers could not secure war oders
and as a result were unable to readily obtain material.
Many were forced to relinquish their business.
Manufacturing lines which produced Articles mainly
used by civilians - food, paper, printing, and publishing,
leather and leather products, and stone, clay, and glass -
exhibited the rising deaths expected when markets began
to shrink rapidly. A growing number of non-essential in-
dustries were shut down because of the halt to civilian
production
.
Sales of durable goods started to fall off in 19^2
partly because of rationing and the depletion of stocks,
partly because consumers had covered their needs so liberally.
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Consequently, lines such as the motor vehicle trade,
electrical appliance trade, and civilian metal products,
suffered casualties.
While rising prices presented the semblance of
prosperity, the spread between retail and wholesale prices
was rapidly dwindling in 1942 and gross profit margins of
retailers were tending to decrease.
Other causes of business failure besides the under-
lying causes that are invaraibly present exerting their
power and influence, were:
1. A labor shortage due to the loss of men to
higher paid jobs in war industries and to military service.
2. The inability to obtain materials, equipment,
or parts.
3. The inability of some concerns to convert their
plant facilities to war uses.
4. The inability to cope with the problems of
adjusting production methods to the new conditions of
supply .
5. Rationing controls in the consumer market.
6. The setting of price ceilings over goods.
7 i The absorption of much of the business of
civilian trucking concerns by Government orders, trans-
portation, etc.
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I. BUSINESS FAILURES IN 194?
A. ANALYSIS OF FAILURES
Business failures continued to decline in 1943 and
the year ended with an insolvency rate which was the
lowest on record. During this year there was an average
of only one failure for every three in 1942, which rep-
resented an actual decrease of 66$ - an unusually sharp
drop. The current liabilities and the total liabilities
for the year showed a 55$ and 46$ downturn, respectively,
as compared with the figures of 1942.
The drop in failures of small and medium size con-
cerns was due to a large extent to the unprecedented fall-
ing off in the number of business openings since the be-
ginning of the war. Although an examination of the failure
record revealed a decrease of 68$ for small businesses
and a decrease of 64$ for medium enterprises, these two
groups with liabilities under $25,000 still composed 90$
of the total number of reported failures. Active business
in both production and distribution was reflected in the
drop in large failures, a matter of approximately 57$
•
In comparison to 1942, the five main industry
groups registered decreases in every individual line on
record. The main groups, manufacturing, wholesaling,
retailing, construction, and commercial service, evidenced
£,&u mi Bfi^ieoa





baa nt snlioeb od beuni^coo a «r:/ I : taeaJtexjfi
' i. - €s ti v; rioinw s+a*! ^onevtcnnl n ; . ri-tiw bebne !«? *ri?
©ga'ieva ci& caw ©*iex£t -tae^ Eiri,+ ^ain; J . ta>. j ’
Oififl % S» L r. ; ©e'lrirf ^ievs -lol eiulla* D ^lno lo
cj'tBfic ^IX&acunu ore - Fp'o lo ©eae'ioeb I&iKtaa aa bertaeae*
JllldaJtl lactotf er !
/i foere* ; si -‘uvu.0 ?;dr* ban uc & Oevoi'ie u-e^ ?<d+ *io ri
-noo ©ale mulb* 10 asnullsl nl co*iI) exiT
'
i egalaeqo esenisjja 'to ‘iMmua ©fit al Ylo gnJt
erusll&l ©xld lo ac d+I.-, . ifm sritf So galoot-g
oeeeeeJtaad Ilaaic xol So osae^osb & belsev©*x frioosT.
ovt etetfcj *e©eiiq'v:-:\ie mrlbeat ioi : ? .j .
-.as
• stc b«8oq£ioo £.. J COO t siS v 'i ja.
I
tilld.fi 1 1 i.-'iv equort;-
eeealeuc ©v ’ ’‘oA . ©©‘H/IisS be 4 ••*.<) c-'.-i it .ed.tLT. iuto -1 :.' 4 So
srli ai. betfoelSet . : - ‘
.
, £ io 'le.-j- 4 a * seminal espial nt coib
t r-i/v.u 0 ’/il enH ot ' i uo n_
no ©nil l£uM7.! ' 1 ^rsey© at e©«£.8 tio^D bs'ic^elge^ squortg
tgallafielodv tgulifrtoalimaax
,
aquo^s alam exiT . bioo©**
. S^PI lo ee'ix/giS ex# ri^iw be-iaqmoo e-b




declines of from 50$ to 70$. The sharpest drop occurred
in retail trade where failures were off 70$, compared
with 66$ in wholesale trade and 62$ in manufacturing.
Construction and commercial service failures were reduced
about 50$.
With a great proportion of manufactured articles
going toward defense purposes retail and wholesale unit
volume had fallen off. Retail unit sales volume in 1943
was about 1 per cent above 1942 but 7 per cent below 1941,
an all-time high. However, the rise in prices, the more
selective buying habits, and the increased production of
expensive goods had been influential in lifting retail
sales volume in dollars to record levels in 1943 > about
9 per cent above 1942.
Wholesale sales had advanced in 1943 » although at
a slower rate than in the prior year. Durable goods busi-
ness had fallen off considerably with the exception of
jewelry lines. The increase in the non-durable goods
sales compensated for the loss in durable goods sales.
^
Production for 1943 , was about 20 per cent above
1942 and about 48 per cent above 1941. The increase was
less than in each of the previous two years. Output of
war goods constituted about two-thirds of all manufacturing
production in 1943* Civilian goods output was down 9 per
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cent from 1942.
Despite the steel and coal stoppages in June and
December and delays in completing plant equipment, a
record amount of steel was produced, about 3 per cent
above 1942. Iron ore consumption in 1943 gained approxi-
mately 3 per cent over the record 1942 level. The durable
goods which suffered setbacks were: glass containers,
cement, lumber, and furniture. In the non-durable goods,
textiles, paper products, and dairy products registered
2
modest declines when compared with the 1942 output.
Thus, from the above description of business con-
ditions in 1943 > it was not difficult to understand why
failures took such a sudden downturn. Business had im-
proved consistently through 1941 and 1942 and had moved
at an even more rapid pace in this year.
The year 1943 was unique in that it became the
only year in this entire ten-year period in which failures
in all individual lines decreased from the previous year.
B. CAUSES OF FAILURES
The sharp drop in failures in 1943 was due to in-
creased purchasing power which accompanied the accelerated
industrial activity of wartimes and the rapidly falling
2 Ibid
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business birth rate. This decrease in business openings
was the asult of mobilization of manpower, priorities,
shortages, and other conditions which discouraged the
3
starting of new businesses.^
In this period, uncertainty seemed greatest among
owners of filling stations. About one-third of them had
some doubts about staying in business because of gas
rationing and because there were fewer cars on the road.
Even automobile dealers were not this gloomy.
Lumber and building material dealers were unfavor-
ably affected by the price ceiling because retail prices of
lumber and building material were too low in March 19^2, tie
base period used for setting price ceilings. They also
found that their expenses and costs of doing business
were increasing. In addition, the volume of their business
was low. This was due to their inability to get some items
after the ceilings were imposed which diverted much lumber
business from retailers to the mills and the wholesalers.
Price ceilings also had a detrimental affect on
the business of hardware dealers. Mierchandise at whole-
sale took a rise shortly before ceilings went into operation
and retail prices had not been raised correspondingly. In
addition, there was a growing scarcity of hardware items.
^ Dun's Review, Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., July 1943#
p. 21
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Some of the difficulties retailers faced in
1943 were
:
1. Narrowed profit margins.
2. Shortages of goods.
3. Declining volume in some lines because a great
proportion of the manufactured articles were going toward
war purposes; boom volumes in other lines.
4. Rising expense trends.
5 . Unfavorable price ceilings, particularly to
food retailers who had been subjected to a margin squeeze
more than most other retailers.
6. The burden of filling out Government forms,
especially with the introduction of rationing.
Wholesalers in turn suffered because of the inability
to obtain merchandise for wholesale distribution in normal
prewar quantities. The reasons for this condition were:
1. Cessation of the production of automobiles on
February 1, 1942, and the conversion of practically all
plants producing electrical parts and supplies, and plumb-
ing and heating supplies, to the manufacture of critical
war items
.
2. Government restrictions on the importation of
tea and coffee.
3» Rationing of gasoline.
4. Initial reductions in the production of paper
of all grades.
5. Unavailability of silk and only limited quan-
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titles of synthetic yarns obtainable for the manufacture
of hosiery.
6. Limitations placed on lumber by the War Pro-




Other causes of failure in 1945 were:
1. The continued falling off of the durable goods
industry
.
2. The lack of consideration given to small busi-
ness. Large buyers had the preference.
5. The withholding of merchandise for black mar-
ket prices by mills and distributors.
4. The widespread evasion, avoidance, and violation
of ceilings by competitors, and the consequent disadvantage
placed on concerns which tried to observe the ceilings.
5. Inefficiency of new labor.
6. Problem of absenteeism.
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I. BUSINESS FAILURES IN 1944
A. ANALYSIS OF FAILURES
Business failures maintained their very rapid
decline, this time registering a drop of 62 per cent
over the previous year. The total number of 1,222
failures was to that time the lowest figure to be recorded.
The number of failures was less than one -eighth and the
liabilities less than one -fifth those of 1918, the low
year of World War I.
Qiy one failure occurred in 1944 for every three
in 1943* Dun’s Insolvency Index showed an average of 6
concerns failing in 1944 per 10,000 business enterprises,
as compared with 16 in 1943 and 44 in 1942. This insolvency
rate for 1944 established a new all time low, bettering
the mark set in 1943 "by nearly 60 Per cent.
The tendency manifested in 1943 for small failures
to drop off more rapidly than large failures became even
more pronounced in 1944; due to this, the aggregate current
liabilities in 1944 amounted to almost 70 per cent last
year's total, although there were only 38 per cent as many
failures
.
Apparently failures were levelling off - the decline
from 1943 to 1944 was less sharp than from 1942 to 1943.
The downtrend continued in all Industry, trade, and size
groups, but it slackened considerably in manufacturing
failures and in failures involving liabilities of $25,000
or more. This was substantiated by the records which
IX H2'iu. i- 0
.a agukiiix 3fr .ixu-i .:
JSKUJI AX. 35 ! v- t , .A
bXqao. jnrv -iXerid beoXadaXari f. eii/XX&l arcnieua
'•.
c, -it " ic; co ib £ gnlisdal, ©i iJt ct el rid- t scXlo b
SSS<X lo ri9Granjr laded ©xlT BuoXve'xq 1
*beJb*Jooei sd od ©ajigl'l daev, d darld od sr-w 8«rn/XXal
©rid bna ddxl£l©»6flo aarid ee el ccv B©*UJXIal to ‘lecfxm/n eriT
c
1
• - t '
XI lil bl'lCW* to LBi Z
pc-Trld ^'isvt xo" J4‘>01 nl boiifrooo ©xXtat eno ^JrD
• bevoxle zeJbnl ^onevloeal e* njj<3 *£^X nl
t--. at-. ... ; . DOGFOX •: 4-.r ai j.aXXXat «a«if>onoo
?4>aevIoeaX aXil? .S*^X ai . E . J. aX dl w ecaqaoo eg





. CtXI cl *eu All"' cX
I, ^ daellnam ^oa©baed eriT
ciev- ei.c-oo.. ©; ial a?.nd v;1 6J.c-.i-.-; snom tto rjoib od




fraXXoeJb ©rid - rio gcXIXevaX ciew sa-irlXal ^|doe%8qqA
.
’ S^Q.1 inoo.l narid q'laxfa eceX eav ^4^1 od £^X nto'tt
©'ste bpa *©Jbjrxd I'gidaxfbfi xX bejt/aidnoo bne'idnwob 9x1?





showed that samll failures with liabilities under $25,000
were down 65 per cent, while large failures with liabili-
ties over $25,000 were reduced only 3 ** per cent.
In 19^4 there was an indication of a trend upward
in over-all industrial operations. The expanding schedules
in war output resulted generally in a slowing up or
cessation of further reconversion, especially in critical
labor shortage areas or in programs where there was any
interference with military operations.
The pace of productive activity was clearly re-
flected in the gradual climb in manufacturers' shipments
since 19*11. An underlying factor in the high volume of
shipments was the constant large output of war goods as
well as the seasonal gains in a few non-durable goods
industries. Another significant factor was the sharp
increase in new orders to over three times the 1939 average.
Again the bulk of new business was in durable goods manu-
facturing which was devoted to war purposes . 1
Although business continued to be good in 1944,
there were signs that business failures would soon termi-
nate their downward movement. These indications originated
from the proposals that government war orders and contracts
should start being cut; it was felt that the war would
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soon end. The slow down In war orders had an immediate
and adverse affect on manufacturers of producers ' goods
as they are always first to feel the results of a de-
crease in demand. It caused the number of their failures
to suddenly increase at the same time that failures in
other industries continued declining. This was proven
by the failure record which revealed that machinery
and transportation equipment, producers' goods industries
listed in the manufacturing groups, were the only two
individual lines which exceeded the failures in 19^5*
Hence, the developments in industry in 1944 made it. pos-
sible to predict the probably trend of business failures
in the next few years.
B * CAUSES of failures
The number of firms in operation began declining
from the peak in 1941 until they reached their lowest
point in the early part of 1944. Toward the end of the
year the curve once ggain was climbing just as sharply as
it had fallen in the two previous years. The small number
of failures in 1944 reflected the cumulative effect of
these two years of diminishing numbers of business open-
ings .
Although still at high levels, there were mildly
downward tendencies in 1944 in business activity, industrial
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by the increased failures in 1944 over 1943 in the machin-
ery and transportation equipment lines, by the large num-
ber of failures in the M$ 100, 000 or more" class, and by
the fact that the manufacturing group accounted for 30$
of the total number of failures.
As the possibility of the end of the war in the
near future became stronger, war contracts were beginning
to be cancelled in 1944 to preclude the possibility of
accumulating excessive stockpiles of war goods. This led
to a sudden curtailment of orders in the producers* goods
industries which caused the number of failures in that
type of business to increase.
While the pressure for some defense items had in-
creased, the needs for other war goods load fallen off with-
out any significant counter-balancing increase in civilian
output. This diminution of productivity was enough to
create difficulties for many concerns and for some, actual
failure
.
Retailers continued to be perplexed by problems of
narrowed profit margins, shortages of goods, declining
volume in some lines, excessive inventories in other lines,
and all the other difficulties of wartime. The chief
reason for discontinuance among the food merchants was
the difficulty of getting merchandise - the well-known
shortages of sugar, coffee, butter, meats, and canned goods.
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There was also difficulty in regard to blanks to fill
out, reports to make - the general Government burden on
doing business.
In this discussion of the causes of business
failures in 19^ 4, it must be borne in mind that the various
fundamental causes of failure, previously listed in this
report, were just as pernicious this year as they are in
every year
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CHAPTER XII
I. BUSINESS FAILURES IN 1945
a. analysis of failures 1
The 42 business failures in December was the lowest
number in any month on record. It brought to a close the
lowest year in more than 50 years of failure history.
The 810 concerns that i&iled in 1945 marked the first time
annual failures had fallen below 1,000. This total was
only one -eighth the number occurring in the lowest year
of World War I. The rate of decline, however, seemed to
have slowed down since failures in 194,5 were down only
54 per cent whereas between 1942 and 1945 and 1945 and
1944 the decline amounted to some 60 per cent.
Dun's Insolvency Index indicated that less than
three concerns failed per 10,000 business enterprises.
A record low was thus established. Theaverage failure
rate for 1945 was 4.2, compared with 6.5 in 1944 and 16.4
in 1945.
The number of failures was one -third lowee than
a year ago, but the aggregate volume of liabilities of
the failures came within 4 per cent of equalling the 1944
total. This resulted from a rise in the number of excep-
tionally large failures involving losses of more than
$100,000. However, firms that failed in all other size
1 Dun’s Review, Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., February
1946
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groups dropped to a record low; the rate of decline varied
inversely with the size.
All trade and industry groups had fewer concerns
failing than in 1944
,
hut the rate of decline had lessened
as it did in the size groups. Tie smallest decrease, 20
per cent, was in manufacturing, while the biggest drop,
around 40 per cent, occurred in retail trade and con-
struction. Three -fourths of the year's 810 deaths were
concentrated in retailing ana manufacturing. In terms of
individual businesses, only four had asmany as 50 failures
during the year - machinery manufacturing, food retailing,
eating and drinking places, and building subcontracting.
The largest number took place in eating and drinking places
with failures at 90. But even in this line, failures
were at a new low in 1945* In fact, in nearly all businesses,
failures were at the lowest level in failure history.
Contrary trends appeared in only a few lines. There were
slight increases this year in failures in mining, leather
manufacturing, iron and steel manufacturing, miscellaneous
public services, and business and repair services.
More than half the aggregate losses for 1945 were
involved in the failure of manufacturing concerns. In
five industrial lines, losses were higher than $1,000,000 -
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B. CAUSES OF FAILURES
The number of firms in operation increased very
sharply in 1945. This movement was probably responsible
for many of the 615 small failures with liabilities under
$ 25 , 000 , because the preponderance of new businesses come
under the small size group. However, the total number
of failures actually did decrease because business was
flourishing, especially in the retail trade. Other firms
that went out were either marginal or in their first year
of operation. In the latter case the owners were usually
insufficiently qualified to have entered the business.
Manufacturing failures accounted for over one-third
of the total number of failures. This was evident upon an
examination of the index of industrial production which
went steadily downward throughout the year. It dropped
from 254 In January to 164 in December of 1945* Industrial
production fell off because of declines in munitions out-
put. Also, with the arrival of V-S and V-J Days, can-
cellations and cuts in war orders proceeded at a faster
pace. In addition, with three-fifths of the country’s
production going to war purposes, obviously the level
of production activity depended upon both the reduction
in the programs for production of war goods and upon how
fast reconversion to production of civilian goods took
place. However, raw material and manpower shortages were
•- * '» l»— I
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still prevalent in many major industries and these impeded
reconversion activities. A coal shortage and labor strikes
in October, November and December of 1945 also held up
the output of goods.
The construction industry continued to be hampered
by the lack of lumber which was a big factor in the accumu-
lation of the 92 reported failures in that field.
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CHAPTER XIII
I. BUSINESS FAILURES IN 1946
A. ANALYSIS OF FAILURES 1
In December business failures rose to 14 1, the
highest number in 28 months. The total for the year
amounted to 1130. This marked an upturn from the record
low of 810 established in 145* Thus, the long eight-year
decline in failures had ended. The Failure Index, which
indicates the rate of failure per 10,000 business enter-
prises, averaged 5*2 in 1946 compared with 4.2 in 1945
and 54.4 in 1941.
The aggregate liabilities involved in failures
reached the largest volume in four years. Losses were
twice as heavy as in either 1945 or 1944, totalling $70,
349*000. In 1946 eight companies failed with liabilities
over $1,000,000, more than in any year since 1941. Medium-
size failures turned up from tie record low levels estab-
lished a year ago, although at a more moderate rate of
increase. Only small failures with losses under $5*000
continued, for the fifth consecutive year, to decline, reach-
ing another new low. The rate of decline had eased up
in this size group in 1946.
In all Industry and trade groups more firms failed
than In 1945* The largest rises were recorded in the whole -
1 Dun's Review, Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., Februarv
1947* pp.“3?7J4;36.
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sale trade and manufacturing, with about 67 per cent
more failures than in 19^5 • The smallest rise occurred
in retail trade where business casualties were up only
5 per cent. For the first time in failure history,
manufacturers outnumbered retailers in failures.
Only one individual business, machinery manufactur
ing, had over 100 concerns failing during 19^6. Failures
in this line were more numerous in 19^6 than in any year
since 1939* In only three other businesses did failures
run over 50 ; lumber manufacturing, eating and drinking
places, and building subcontracting. Very few lines had
a smaller number of concerns going out of business in
19^6 than in 19^5*
More than 50 per cent of the year's total lia-
bilities were concentrated in manufacturing. In two in-
dividual manufacturing lines, machinery and transportation
equipment, liabilities were above $10,000,000. They
were over $1,000,000 in all except three of the eleven
manufacturing lines.
B. CAUSES OF FAILURES
In 19^6, a transition had taken place from war to
peace and it is a generally accepted rule that in good
times or bad, failures are higher under free enterprise
than under the controls of a war economy.
During 19^6, there was a marked increase in
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business population. The shrinkage of retail stores and
services due to four years of war was made up in the
first year of peace. Commercial enterprises listed in
the Dun and Brads tree t He fe re nee Book in 1946, reached
an all-time high and continued to gain as retailers
2
entered a wide variety of trades.
Between December, 1944, and December, 1946, with
veterans taking their places in civilian life and supplies
of material and merchandise for civilian use gradually
increasing, fully one million new enterprises were started.
The net growth in the business population was 700,000
during this two-year period. These new, untrained business-
men who entered the field presented both a human and an
economic problem. That they were responsible for many
of the 1946 failures was shown by the fact that nearly
two-fifths of all firms, which were liquidated or sold
in the second quarter of 1946, did not prepare annual
Profit and Loss Statements
Because of favorable economic conditions, business
failures were low in the year under consideration. For
those firms that did fail during 1946, the principal cause
2
3 Ulmer, M. J., Busine ss Turn - over and Cause s of
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to which failure was attributed by proprietors was a
scarcity of merchandise and materials. Of secondary
importance was the difficulty encountered in getting
competent employees, a result of the low level of un-
employment and the competition for labor engendered by
the high level of business activity.
Other causes of substantial importance were:
1. Increase in labor costs.
2. Labor disputes.
3. Coal shortages.
4. Decline in exports.
5* Difficulty in securing customers.
6 . Lack of capital.
7. Price uncertainties.
8 . Rent increases.
9- Equipment and repair scarcity.
10. Continued inactivity in capital goods in-
dustries .
Scarcity of merchandise was an important factor in
almost all industries, but was especially significant in
the retail durable-goods lines and in construction.
War industries which were unable to convert to a
peacetime product had to close because of "lack of
customers. 1 ' These concerns were considered "marginal."
The underlying causes of business failure were in
operation as usual, playihg a very important part in the
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I. BUSINESS FAILURES I 3 1947
A. ANALYSIS OF FAILURES
During the first five months of 1947 > commercial
and industrial failures continued the steady upswing which
began in December 1946. From June to the end of the year,
monthly failure totals fluctuated mildly with a total
Increase of about 10$ for the seven month period. The
actual total number of failures for the year was >,476,
the highest for any year since 1942. There were about three
times as many failures In 1947 as In the previous year.
They were only one -fourth as numerous as in the immediate
pre-war years and about one -eighth as numerous as in the
late 1920’s and early 1930 ’s. A very sharp upward move-
ment occurred in the failure rate with the index rising
175$ above the 1946 figure. In other words the Failure
Index for 1947 had a rate of about 14 failures for each
10,000 concerns in business. This compared with a rate
of 5 ?er 10,000 concerns a year in 1946 and four in the
record-low year 1945*
The total liabilities in 1947 amounted to $221,000,
000, approximately three times the total for la3t year.
They surpassed the liabilities of each year since 1938.
One reason for the sharp post-war rise in liabilities was
the unusually great increase in exceptionally large
failures. Insolvent companies with liabilities of from
./ix aar^D
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$100,000 to $1,000,000 In 19^7 totaled 250, the highest
number for this group since 1935* The failure record
also included 22 businesses with liabilities of over
$1,000,000 each. These figures combined represented an in-
crease of 196$ over a similar group in 19^6. The greatest
number of failures appeared once again in the medium-
size group, while the smallest Increase in failures oc-
curred for the sixth consecutive year in the class with
liabilities under $5>000, Failures of $25,000 and under,
continued to account for 65$ of the total insolvencies.
Sharp increases from the number of failures in
19^6 took place in all trades, with both wholesale and
retail failures about four times as numerous as those of
a year ago. By comparison, there was a small increase
from 19^6 in construction and commercial service.
In the manufacturing group there were more machinery
manufacturers failing than in any other line. Other appre-
ciable increases were evident in food, textiles, lumber,
and apparel. Retail failures were heaviest among eating
and drinking places, food stores, apparel, and automotive
products. There was a sharp increase over 19^6 in failures
of furnitures stores. Over half of the failures in the
furniture line were concentrated in the electrical appliance
and radio field. In commercial service, failures in the
transportation field and repair service, principally
••
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electrical, predominated. In construction, the sub-
contracting group suffered most.
£. CAUSES op failures
The causes of business failure in 19^7 resolved
themselves dichotomous ly ; those that precipitated the
small failures and those that brought about an approxi-
mately equal number of large failures.
The small failures, those with liabilities under
$25,000, were principally the result of the increasing
number of firms in operation, the scarcity of materials,
and the inexperience of owners. In 19^7 there were more
than 3,783,600 concerns, mostly small, doing business in
the U. S. Thus, the risks and the expectations that a
company, particularly a little one, might fail were much
greater. The vast majority of the small insolvent firms
were in their first year of operation. The owners had
entered extremely crowded fields, generally retailing,
while materials were still scarce. This, coupled with
the fact that the new proprietors lacked experience and
sufficient capital and were incompetent, caused the even-
tual elimination of the inefficient small companies.
The large insolvencies with liabilities of $25,000
and over, occurred mainly to firms that had been established
in the war years. During wartime the newly organized busi-
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orders, ready markets for their products, and no com-
petition. In the post-war years, however, there were
no longed any government orders, supplies of raw materials
grew scarce, costs increased and work stoppages were pre-
valent because of the temporary closing of bituminous
coal mines. The short supply of several key basic materials,
sheet steel in particular, was difficult to endure. These
shortages retarded the production of many manufactured pro-
ducts at a time when order back logs for automobiles,
railroad equipment, farm implements and certain types of
industrial machinery, remained large. At the same time,
skilled labor continued to be hard to find in many indus-
trial areas. As a result of these various factors, com-
panies were forced out of business. The vast majority of
these failures were the "marginal” concerns which could
not adjust themselves to the change-over from wartime to
peacetime production.
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CHAPTER XV
I. SUMMARY OF THE CAUSES OF BUSINESS FAILURE
The years 1958 through 1947 Indicated that failures,
whether in good times or bad, were higher under free enter-
prise than under the controls of a war economy. Two im-
protant types of business casualties were brought out in
this period; those which suffered from excessive inventories
and those which were impeded by a lack of goods. The first
mentioned class of failures usually had the larger creditor
list and was prevalent in the prewar, depression years.




A study of this period showed that the smaller
concern usually had the higher mortality. The average
businessman with small resources probably lacked both
the experience and the opportunities of the larger capi-
talist and tended to enter an overcrowded field in active
competition both with many similar small concerns and
with larger and better organized businesses supported by
more capital.^
Year after year during the decade, failures moved comersely
to general business conditions and were so sensitive to bu&-
ness changes that very little lag was apparent between an
1 Comparative Failure Trends : 1915-1925 > 1958- 1947 >
Dun and Brad street, Inc., 194'B’I
2 Ibid.
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upturn in business and a decline in failures, or a
3decline in business and an increase in failures.
In the prewar years the environment of low business
activity was. In the writer’s opinion, the predominant
characteristic. The psychological and political factors,
stemming from the unsettled conditions in Kurope, were
apparently keeping industrial production down. No one
seemed to know exactly what to do or how to plan for the
future in regard to production schedules and purchasing.
As a result entrepreneurs were hesitant to do much more
than maintain a "middle of the road" business policy.
They were waiting for some definite indication as to the
final outcome of the hostile movements In Europe.
This atmosphere of unreliability seemed to affect
investors and buyers, causing them to assume a conser-
vative attitude. Management appeared to be suffering
from a lack of confidence which was reflected in the
h
lethargic business conditions.
It was under these difficult circumstances that
the number of new businesses increased. They not only
chose a bad time to enter business, but started opa?ating
with only small amounts of capital. This was indicated
5 Ibid .










. e.« udt&J n 1 ©eao'xqfU aa bns aoenleutf til fso.ilo«&
eti -.icieud woI to faeac - :ivn© tvi.-t -ubvmi Brief n.I
ttnaniittoJta'iq sritf a : ; iw t&$ oJt <e«v vflvlfQB
^ricios'i Isold-Hoc driT . ollelieloaiario
t**iev ^cvr.u* ai '.QOi -laoo £k\v
1
^oenu ©ill moat &n z
\
©w oil .avon -io . 1 >.;bo : .c I&lideM r>! -a ' ;©©V iae:c.£
Brief ’ wOi. 16 oJb ol lariv ^Icfoaxe wocnf of bemeea
3«*x iil ©it/Xu1
101 r:ou:r. c ' "It A .. ©v au ,:ST . . J : ? XIu.;?; a t
A
.
^roXXoq aeeaXii/d “boo* -etif lo eloM




iieee \f XicfBlI o-mu to
-
.
.. ..)..• pivt;eK;, '
* tf ?nc sioefEavul
SnliBllue cd of oeiaeqqa Xu©m©BJ3naM « ©fortitfefa Bvtlav
ri,
1
nl D 4 :) Hoi &i v rioirfw ©oa©b.J:tooo ’to >IorI c oil
. r. ; - : , •: -
•' f.I
seonuXBmuo-iio fi; oi l > s^riX :. onu . ?.y 11




' 0? ;.. t L.. . c....vT *:
' f-mll o
beXsoXbnX eaw elri? ,Ib1Xqbo lo aXm/o©fi llama ^Xno ri.-flv
rioiaM t .oal Jbna cijjCI t w©Xv Kl e * nuCT **
•. *85
104
by the Increase in the number of very small concerns
that failed, as shown in Tables 2,5, and 8.
The feeling of uncertainty on the part of business
together with a surrounding influence of depressed busi-
ness activity, apparently were the most prevalent "occasion' 1
causes of business failures during the prewar period.
The charing national economy entered the war
phase in August 1940. Business activity rapidly rose
when the domestic program of defense went into operation
and consumer buying and consumer income increased. As
American industries adjusted themselves to wartime pro-
duction, government war contracts became plentiful, ready
markets for virtually all finished goods were available,
and business in general increased. The result was that
business failures reached unprecedented low levels as
pointed out in Tables 19, 22, and 25.
However, there were business casualties even in
this boom period. The presence of such things as ration-
ing, priorities, labor shortages, scarcity of materials,
rising operating costs, price ceilings, and voluminous
government reports, were a necessary evil in wartime as
far as business and industry were concerned. Companies
that overcame these difficulties became very successful.
On the other hand, concerns, like the small manufacturers
for example, who could not conquer these obstacles and
firms in non-e S3ential industries producing and selling
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articles mainly used by civilians, found themselves in a
very unfortunate position, often resulting in failure.
These organizations, because of their size or nature of
their business, could not secure war orders. Consequently,
they had no priorities with which to obtain much needed
material for the production of goods.
It seemed to the author that if any one ’’immediate"
cause were to be held accountable for the failures which
occurred in the war period, it would be the shortages of
material and labor.
The post-war phase actually began during 19^4. At
that time the economic advisers in this country proposed
the curtailment of government orders because they feld the
war would soon be over. In this same year, as consumers'
goods industries began to really prosper as a result of the
business boom, producers' goods industries experienced an
opposite effect. The slow down in war orders caused the
number of their failures for example in the iron and 3teel,
machine tool, and transportation equipment industries,
to suddenly increase, while failures In other industries
continued to decline. The manufacturers of producers'
goods, being in the 3tage of production furthest from the
consumer, are always the first to feel the consequences
of any reduction in demand.
In the following years, although business conditions
were good, owners were 3till confronted with many diffi-
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culties. Raw material and manpower shortages were still
apparent, but were not as critical as they were during
wartime. Small businesses found difficulty in meeting
increased operating costs. Labor disputes in general
and the coal strikes in particular, began to exert an
Increased influence upon American economy. Lastly, the
complete elimination of war orders, because of the ces-
sation of hostilities, brought about a down ward movement
in industrial production. This was clearly brought out
by Dun and Brads tree t’s Index of Industrial Production
for those post-war years in Dun 1 s Review .
These hindrances probably caused only a small
percentage of the total failures in the post-war period.
The vast majority of insolvencies, it appeared to the
author, resulted from "marginal 11 firms which were unefcLe
to convert to a peacetime product, and from businesses
in their first year of operation. In the latter case,
the owners seemed to be, generally speaking, Insufficiently
5qualified to have entered that business.
In conclusion it should be stated that the ever-
present "underly ing'1 or ”fundame ntal 11 causes, as explained
in Chapter 3 of this report, have been indirectly re-
sponsible for all of the failures in this period. Roy A.
5 Comparative Failure Trends : 1915 - 1923 j 1938-19^7 ,
Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., 194FT
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Foulke clarifies this point in the following statement:
Business successes and failures are
largely measures of managerial foresight
or lack of foresight, ability or inability,
hardworking or easy-going leadership .
^
^ Roy A. Foulke,
Dun and Brads tree t, Inc
Behind the Scenes of Buslne ss
,
. ,
Revised Edition 1937/1? • 156.
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